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County to county migration and labour market
conditions in Hungary between 1994 and 2002
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely*
In this paper I use county to county migration data to estimate the effect of labour market
conditions on these flows. A gravity model is estimated on Hungarian NUTS 2 regions
for the period between 1994 and 2002. Such results are not available for Hungary so far.
Estimated parameters show significant and expected effects of local amenities, distances
and labour market conditions. Although the magnitude of the estimated parameters is not
small, they are not sizeable enough to compensate for the overall low level of migration.
* For this paper only the author is responsible.
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1 Introduction
Hungary, along with other Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, performed well around the beginning
of the new millennium in terms of economic growth.
Behind the increase of average performance howev-
er, there is a substantial amount of dispersion in both
output and opportunities. In 2002 the best county1 in
terms of GDP produced 4 times the output of the
poorest one (Gyo˝r and Nógrád, respectively, not
counting Budapest and Pest county among the best,
which are far ahead).2 Labour market opportunities
show less pronounced, but quite substantial hetero-
geneity. The lowest employment rate of the popula-
tion between 15 and retirement age3 is 45 percent
(Szabolcs), whereas the highest is 66 percent (Zala).
Average earnings vary even more, although this vari-
ation is again smaller if we exclude Budapest from
the comparison, but there is still 50 percent difference
between average wages in the poorest Szabolcs or
Békés and the top performer Fejér or Gyo˝r (again ex-
cluding Budapest and Pest county). Although differ-
ences in wages shrink substantially if we control for
compositional effects, the same is not true for em-
ployment opportunities (see Nagy 2004 and Köllo˝
2004 on this matter). Because average wages and em-
ployment opportunities are correlated in space, the
question arose over and over the past years: what will
be the mechanism, if any, that equilibrates these dif-
ferences?
Regional differences are only partly increasing over
time. Figure 1 shows the normalised coefficient of
variation of average wages and employment rates at
the county-level. After a moderate increase from
1993, differences in employment rates are stagnant
from 1997 on. Differences in average wages on the
other hand, were increasing steadily from around
1995, following the overall growth of the economy.
If prices of the same good are not the same in differ-
ent, but interconnected markets, we can expect that
such a difference will vanish over some time as a re-
sult of goods or factors being transported to and sold
in places where their price is high. Regional differ-
ences should be no exception – in space, this arbi-
trage can happen through the relocation of capital and
labour. Although there is a slight sign of change in
this trend recently, Barta (2004) for example shows
that it is the most western and richest county of 
Hungary that attracted most foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the 1990s, a core factor in both regional and
country-level economic performance. Eastern parts
of the country, where many low wage and low em-
ployment regions are located, seem to be left behind
in this respect. This can possibly be attributed to spa-
tial differences in the inherited industrial structure
and knowledge that proved to be valuable after the
economic transformation, amplified by favourable
spillover effects, as recent evidence by Békés (2004)
shows. Regardless of the reason, location choices of
foreign firms show that FDI and capital in general
has not only been favouring already advanced re-
gions, but it is not too mobile either when it comes to
within-country relocation. If firms are reluctant to
initiate an equilibrating process by using workforce
from depressed regions, it is migration of the popula-
tion that can work towards diminishing regional dif-
ferences.
1.1 Mobility in Hungary
The Hungarian society is not a mobile one. It is
around 4 percent of the population that changes resi-
dence during a year such that the registered address is
in a new municipality. This includes those moving
their permanent address and also those moving only
their temporary one. Thinking about regional differ-
ences and migration, it is probably the former type
we would like to consider, as it is permanent migrants
1 Counties are the NUTS 2 regions in Hungary, a regional unit one
level below what is called a (NUTS 1) “region” in the EU. There
are 20 counties, and Budapest, the capital is one of them.
2 This grows to a 30-fold difference if we include Budapest and
Pest county. This procedure however can be misleading. There are
firms who have separate firms for their plants and acitivities, but
many of them have a headquarter in Budapest acting as a profit
centre.
3 Although the earliest retirement age is increasing from 1997 on,
the effective one did not change much from 55 (females) and 60
(males) years of age, due to several legally provided early retire-
ment opportunities.
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who commit to bind their life to a given region. Tem-
porary movers might also have motives that ultimate-
ly lead to diminishing regional differences, but being
a very heterogeneous population, they need consider-
ation that available data does not make possible.4
Looking at only permanent movers, the mobility rate
halves to around 2 percent. But again, if we are inter-
ested in regional inequalities, probably only those
migrants are relevant, who cross the boundaries of
the chosen regional units and not those who move
from a core city to the surrounding green belt.
Partly because of substantial reasons, partly because
of data availability, I am looking at county-level dif-
ferences and migration. The substantial reason for us-
ing counties (or rather: any unit above the settlement-
level) is that relocation to suburbs and the formation
of suburban agglomerations is a dominant feature of
the Hungarian mobility pattern. Although such
processes can have economic and indeed labour mar-
ket related aspects (such as sorting by skill, see
Brueckner/Thisse/Zenou 2002, for example), this is
not something we are interested here. If however we
consider only those permanent movers, who cross the
boundaries of counties (who will be called migrants
hereafter), we obtain a migration rate of 1 percent.
This figure is rather low, no matter what comparison
we consider, and is almost constant over time (see
Figure 2 for a comparison).
We can look at the low mobility figures from a differ-
ent, a spatial point of view. I have already noted that
one great drop in the mobility rate occurs as we re-
strict attention to those crossing county borders. To
explore that idea further, one can look at how much
of the intensity of mobility is changing with the dis-
tance spanned. Locations are different, however. Peo-
ple at central locations have no chance to cross the
longest distances, but have more possibilities to go to
shorter ways, and those in remote areas have a
greater selection of distances, but with a smaller set
for each. Because of this, the measured intensities are
shaped by the choice set as well. To filter out this ef-
fect, we can divide the observed migration propor-
tions by the proportion of routes to a given distance,
thereby reducing the dominance of potentially more
frequent routes and get the pure effect of choice. Fig-
ure 3 depicts both the raw and adjusted (and nor-
malised) intensities for the period between 1992 and
2002. As we have already seen, around 50 percent of
all moves happen within a county and yet again 50
percent of the remaining moves happen between ad-
jacent counties. Reaching developed areas from un-
derdeveloped ones often requires crossing at least
one full county, but mostly more – only a very small
proportion of migration reaches that far.
1.2 Previous evidence
Literature on Hungarian migration is quite sparse,
and studies framed in an economic context are hard
to find. On the one hand, we have a handful of quite
4 Cseres-Gergely (2004) notes that seasonal fluctuations in the
number of such people indicates that a large share of them can be
students. Despite of such concerns, I attempted to estimate the
model presented later on temporary migrants. This, as opposed to
the case of permanent ones, produced very different and unexpec-
ted results.
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accurate descriptions of migration from the demogra-
phers’ point of view – these mostly appeared in a vol-
ume edited by Illés and Tóth (1998). Such studies
point out a number of interesting features of mobility
and migration, such as its relation to suburban devel-
opment, the demise of the migration of low skilled
workers, or the phenomenon of migrant-commuters.
They do not however offer conclusions about labour
market effects.
Among the few that do elaborate on economic ef-
fects, we find first the study of Kertesi (2000), who –
looking at commuting in the same paper – models
gross and net migration flows out and into settle-
ments between 1990 and 1994. Including proxies for
labour market characteristics, such as the number of
companies, local average income, unemployment
rate and commuting possibilities, Kertesi estimates a
simultaneous equation system of in- and outmigra-
tion. Push and pull forces are connected to economic
motives; density of enterprises and tax paid per tax-
payer being important pull, whereas unemployment,
share of agricultural employment, different types of
commuting behaviour and the proportion of gipsy
population are the most important push factors. Al-
though it is not clear from a theoretical point of view,
why the specific variables enter the equations and
why in the proposed configuration, the results are ap-
pealing and are in line with evidence from other
sources. Nevertheless it is not clear, whether results
from the early 1990s are valid today.
A second study is due to Fidrmuc (2002), who looks
at gross out- and immigration flows in several then
acceding countries, including Hungary, and also in
some EU member countries as a benchmark. Run-
ning linear regressions with out-, in- and net-migra-
tion rates of counties as the dependent variable on
county-level data for the period between 1994 and
1998, three main findings emerge. Firstly, it is only
net migration that seems to respond to wages and un-
employment rates in the expected way, i.e. such that
higher wages encourages, while higher unemploy-
ment discourages in- and net migration to a region.
Results for Hungary and the Czech Republic are
comparable to responsiveness obtained from Italy,
but still not very significant in economic terms. Sec-
ondly, it seems that the effect of wages is nonlinear,
high wage regions receiving disproportionately high
share of migrants. Thirdly, it seems that Budapest
(and also Pest county) behaves in a peculiar way that
is not comparable to other counties.
In a third paper, Cseres-Gergely (2004) attempts to
quantify the effect of wages and unemployment on
migration using individual-level data. Based on indi-
vidual-level data from the 1996 Microcensus of the
Hungarian Statistics Office (HCSO), Cseres-Gergely
estimates a probit model for individual migration de-
cision in which the local average wage and unem-
ployment rate captures the “push” effect of local
labour markets. Although the responses to these vari-
ables are found to be significant, their economic rele-
vance is not substantial. Because the individual data
registered moves of different ranges, it was crucial
for this result to hold to exclude those moving to the
neighbouring settlements and commuting back to
their previous place of living – usually a larger town.
Apart from being limited to 1996 and the preceding
periods, this study is limited by the fact that it is not
clear what is the underlying population “at risk” of
migration and what is the positive outcome we ob-
serve. Because the exact date of the move between
1990 and 1996 is not known, the population identi-
fied as movers include only once those who moved
many times, but those who moved to one place and
subsequently returned, do not count as movers. Also
only wages and unemployment rates averaged over
the 6 year period could be used, which possibly
dampened the real effects quite substantially.
1.3 Aim of the paper
Stylised facts on migration are rather discouraging
about the relevance of labour mobility in terms of its
potential effect on regional differences. Nevertheless,
even in such a low rate of mobility, it is not clear
what role labour market conditions and economic
factors can play. Evidence so far is mixed and is
based on non-current data.
Can we hope that the usual labour market motives,
wages and employment possibilities have the expect-
ed effect on mobility flows? How substantial is the
adverse effect of distance on migration? Is the role
house markets play in migration clear-cut? My aim
here is to try to clarify these to a greater extent than it
is available to date. Because of the very limited na-
ture of the data at hand, I shall possibly not be able to
get a comprehensive understanding of either of these
phenomena, neither to model migration fully as such.
What I hope is to improve our understanding com-
pared to existing evidence on the role of labour mar-
ket motivations. After a brief description of the data
used and a theoretical motivation, I estimate a gravi-
ty-type model to explore the above questions.
2 Theoretical motivation and data
In the empirical section, I shall be using the well-
known gravity model, the standard workhorse of mi-
gration research that has its roots deep in the history
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of the field. Originally based on an analogy with
physics and Newton’s idea of gravitational force, it
was following the work of Lowry (1966) that gravity
models were extended with economic variables to
represent push and pull effects. The central relation-
ship is 
Pi’ Pj”
mij = g ––––––––dij
with mij being the flow from region i to region j, pi
and pj being the respective “masses” and dij the dis-
tance between region i and region j. Although New-
ton’s theory restricted ’=’’=1, we do have no rea-
son to suppose so in a migration context. To obtain an
equation that is estimable using standard techniques,
this relation is transformed into a linear form by tak-
ing logs:
1nmij =  + ’1nPi + ’’1nPj – 1ndij.
This is the relationship that Lowry extended by
adding economic variables as the generalisations of
Pi and Pj. Although venerable, the model in today’s
world of very detailed micro-level data is considered
to be outdated by many. Nevertheless, it is still used
in cases when such data are not available – and this is
one of such cases. Having access only to aggregate
migration flows, the gravity model seems to be a na-
tural candidate.
2.1 Theoretical motivation
In order to rid of the analogy from physics, the gravi-
ty model can be supported by a microeconomic mod-
el – if one accepts the assumptions that come with it.
Although the end result is almost identical to the
original model, one might hope that a formal exposi-
tion helps empirical investigation. In a study with
similar motivation to mine, Fidrmuc and Huber
(2003) neatly collect the pieces to characterise such a
model. Their elaboration is in turn based on that of
Fields (1979), with some useful verbosity. Here I on-
ly follow the most important points in their reasoning
to expose the idea.
The suggested chain of reasoning starts with a variant
of the random utility model of McFadden (1973)5,
where a decision-maker n living in place i is sup-
posed to choose a place of living j among 1..J possi-
ble alternatives, based upon the expected utility that
arises from living in a given place over some period
of time. The utility derived from a move like that (in
expectation, over a planning horizon) can be written
as Unij (Yj,Aj,Ci,j,nj ), where Yj denotes income in j, Aj
denotes amenities in j, Cij is moving costs from i to j,
and jn is an individual random draw from a prefer-
ence/cost distribution. As the individual chooses the
location that yields the highest utility, the Pij proba-
bility of moving to region j from i is
Pij = Pr[-Uij = max(Ui1,Ui2,...,UiJ)]-.
McFadden’s result is that if Uij is linear in the loga-
rithms of the arguments and the logarithm of the orig-
inal stochastic disturbance has an independent and
identical Weibull distribution across alternatives,
then the probability of moving from one place to the
other is given by
exp(Uij)        exp(11nAj + 21nYj + 31nCij)Pij = –––––––––  = ––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∑
J
k=1
exp(Uik)      ∑
J
k=j
exp(11nAk + 21nYk + 31nCik)
This form of the migration probability gives an easy
formula for the probability of moving from i to j, rel-
ative to that of staying in i, a linear function of the
differences of local characteristics
Pij1n––– = 1(1nAi – 1nAj) + 2(1nYi – 1nYj) + 31nCijPii
If we do not wish to model the determinants of the
number of stayers, we can make use of the fact that
Pij is consistently estimated by the population ratio
Mij / Ni, cancel denominators on the left hand side and
collect Mii to the right. Relaxing the symmetry of the
effect of sending and receiving regions and suppos-
ing a more general impact of the population remain-
ing in the sending region, an equation arises which is
a good starting point for estimation
1nMij = 01nMij + 11nAi + 11nAj + 21nYi + 21nYj + 31nCij.
This equation is almost identical to the gravity for-
mulation, except for here we have the number of
stayers on the right hand side, whereas the gravity
equation has the population for both the sending and
the receiving region. Ak and Yk are just the generalisa-
tions of attraction forces associated with the destina-
tions, and Cij encompasses all the costs of migration,
including that captured by distance. By estimating
the probability with observable quantities, the indi-
vidual characteristics are aggregated as well: they
5 Fields (1979) credits the application of the McFadden model to
the migration problem to T. Paul Schultz (1977): “A Conditional
Logit Model of Internal Migration: Venezuelan Lifetime Migration
within Educational Strata” Economic Growth Center, Yale Univer-
sity, Discussion Paper No. 226, Sept. I could not, unfortunately,
gain access to this material.
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correspond to individual values in the sending and re-
ceiving regions.
Although we have just seen a nice microeconomic
foundation to the gravity model, there is a very im-
portant assumption underlying the derivation, namely
the independence of the individual utility component
from all other components. Individual deviations
from and the values of the representative (mean)
characteristics of both sending and receiving regions
in particular are assumed to be uncorrelated. This im-
plies that migrants select themselves to better desti-
nations based upon their fitness in the sending region.
Such an assumption may or may not be valid, but we
have to understand that it is built into the aggregation
process. While this problem can be tackled with indi-
vidual data, an aggregate analysis has to put up with
the assumption only.
Another property of the model results from the so
called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives as-
sumption of the individual model: characteristics of
regions other than i and j do not affect flows between
them. This is a similar assumption that is often made
(and found wrong) in consumption analysis about ze-
ro cross-price effects. While it is theoretically possi-
ble and desirable to relax such an assumption, it is not
clear how to deal with it in the current framework.6
2.2 Data
To estimate the proposed model, I use data on county
to county migration flows. There are several reasons
for this. Firstly, there is no available individual-level
survey data that could be used to estimate migration
responses reliably. Secondly using counties (as op-
posed to smaller units), it is almost certain that one
does not have to worry about mobility that is actually
connected to suburban relocation. Thirdly, available
surveys on wages and employment are not designed
to be representative at the level of micro-regions, the
next possible smaller regional unit, therefore the esti-
mate of the incentive variables can be precise in this
case. Fourthly, although data on flows between
NUTS 3 micro-regions are collected by the respec-
tive authority, such data are not disclosed to the pub-
lic due to confidentiality reasons.
There are 20 counties (NUTS 2 regions) in Hungary,
geographic units with comparable area and with an av-
erage population of around 500 thousand inhabitants.
One exception from the rule is Budapest, which is a
city with a population of 2 million and concentrating
an atypically high level of economic activity as well.
Data for the counties comes from several sources. The
dependent variable is (the log of) the number of per-
manent migrants from county i to county j in year t.
Data on these flows comes from respective issues of
the Demographic Yearbook of the Hungarian Statistics
Office (HCSO). The TSTAR database of the HCSO
and the IE-HAS, a yearly panel of 1990 to 2002 
provides various data on settlements, which can be ag-
gregated to the level of counties. The Wage Survey of
the National Labour Centre provides yearly payroll
wage data for firms with more than 11 employees be-
tween 1994 and 2002. The Labour Force Survey of the
Central Statistics Office, available for 4 quarters a year
between 1993 and 2002, provides employment data
for at least 80 thousand individuals each quarter. Year-
ly data on per square meter flat prices come from a
database of the HCSO specialised on the flat market,
available on CD-ROM.
Finally, I created proximity data myself. Since in the
case of large regional units, one can pick a continu-
ous distance measure only in a very arbitrary way, I
created a discrete proximity measure. This takes on
the value 1, if two counties are adjacent (i.e. there is 1
border to cross to go from one to the other), 2 if there
is one county “in between” (i.e. there are 2 borders to
cross), and so forth. If there is more than one route
from county i to county j, the shortest is chosen. The
minimum proximity (maximum distance) is 6.
The above data are assembled into a 3-way panel,
spanning a total of 9 years and 400 county to county
flows, a total of 3600 observations. This means that
every explanatory variable enters twice: once for the
sending, secondly for the receiving region. Because
moves within a region are not used for estimation
purposes and data are missing here and there, we end
up with 3040 observations. Descriptive statistics for
all of the variables are provided in the Appendix.
In the spirit of the model7 every variable enter in
logs, and hence this qualifier is omitted in what fol-
lows. Using logs has the unfortunate feature that it
excludes the case of zero migration from one region
to the other. To treat this problem, often a Poisson re-
gression is estimated on the level of migration flows,
which is more plausibly thought of as count data in
6 One could clearly continue the enumeration of difficulties: mi-
gration of families, not individuals; various migration motives that
are only indirectly labour-market related, etc. These are issues that
can be tackled either purely theoretically, or empirically using a
specialised individual-level dataset, neither of which is an option
here.
7 Schultz (1977) argues that it is especially appropriate to take logs
of the right hand side variables in the present case. Because it is
most probably expected income which a migrant takes into ac-
count when deciding upon a move, having average wages and
(un)employment rate in a log-linear formulation allows for a flexi-
ble modelling of the multiplicative interaction.
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case of small regional units. In our case however
there is no need to go beyond the linear regression
framework. Because of the size of the regions and
their distance from each other, there is very little
chance of observing zero migration between regions
(none such case in the actual data). Also because of
this, treating the data as count has little relevance.
The explanatory variables can be divided into four
categories: gravity variables (population sizes and
distance), labour market related-, housing market re-
lated-, and finally “other” indicators, mostly referring
to (dis)amenities in the given county.
I proxy local labour market conditions using wages
and employment rates. Average wages (deflated to
1992 prices using the consumer price index), the un-
conditional expectations for the individual migrants,
are calculated from the Wage Survey as a simple
weighted average. Instead of unemployment, I use em-
ployment rates calculated from the yearly pooled sam-
ples of the LFS. Because unemployed and inactive
persons has a very similar chance of obtaining a job in
Hungary, neither the registered, nor the ILO-conform
unemployment rate represents the true stance of the
labour market (see Micklewright /Nagy 1999).
Based on the evidence and methods presented in Köl-
lo˝ (2004) and Nagy (2004), I have calculated an addi-
tional set of proxies of labour market conditions us-
ing the individual data of the Wage Survey and the
Labour Force Survey, with composition al effects re-
moved. In the case of wages, I ran a very simple Min-
cerian wage regression with the log of gross monthly
wages on the right hand side, schooling (below low-
er-secondary, upper-secondary, and higher educa-
tion), potential experience (inferred from schooling)
and potential experience squared, micro-region level
local unemployment rate, gender-, industry- and
county-dummies on the left hand side. The reference
group was males working in agriculture with upper-
secondary education. The parameters on county dum-
mies became the “cleaned” representation of wages.
In the case of employment, I used a logit model with
schooling, age groups (16-25, 26-36, 37-50, 51-60),
indicators for family status, gender and counties on
the left-hand side.
Although the causality is not understood in great de-
tail, earlier work highlighted the fact that the state of
the real estate market, most notably the flat market
can have a great effect on migration and mobility as
such. Kertesi (2000) argues that it is vacancy chains
that are responsible for preventing mobility. Hegedu˝s
(2004) stresses that changing flats is a risky business:
the potential loss incurred in a less fortunate swap of
flats can be prohibitively high for those in less
favourable economic conditions. To proxy the effects
of the property market, I include the number of flats
built and demolished in an area.
Also because living costs are possibly different in
different regions, one would like to include a region-
al prices index in a migration analysis. This is unfor-
tunately not possible, as such a measure does not ex-
ist. Instead of that, I use per square meter flat prices
to proxy living expenses. Because of the regionally
uniform structure of retail trade (with malls and sub-
urban shopping centres emerging throughout the
county), and the uniform pricing of utilities, flat
prices are possibly one of the most important element
of living expenses.
Local amenities are represented by various factors
characterising public goods, security of the locale
and its desirability: the per capita number of general
practitioners, paediatricians, equivalised number of
tourists visiting the county representing “goods”, the
number of criminal offences and suicides “bads”.
These as always, are supposed to be characteristics
that affect the desirability of a region, hence affecting
the utility the potential migrant is able to derive from
moving to a specific place.
3 Empirical results
The theoretical motivation presented in the previous
section yielded an equation that is estimable using
simple linear regression techniques. Before proceed-
ing with estimation, we have to specify the stochastic
structure of the problem. Because of the availability
of panel data, this can be a fairly general form:
1nMijt = 01nMijt + 11nAit + 11nAjt + 21nYit +
21nYjt + 31nCijt + gt + fij + eijt,
where – in addition to the already discussed variables
– we have a time fixed-effect gt and a county or coun-
ty-pair (“route”) specific effect fij, potentially corre-
lated with the included regressors. Theory does not
advise us which one to use among the latter two, al-
though Mátyás (1997) suggests the county-specific
ones. Although it captures a greater amount of specif-
ic effects, the drawback of using the route-specific ef-
fects is that the effect of proximity (as well as other
time-invariant variables) can not be identified.
3.1 Parameter estimates from different
specifications
The first column of Table 1 presents a model estimate
including the number of stayers, average earnings
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and employment rates in the sending (i) and the re-
ceiving (j) counties, as well as the proximity meas-
ures, along with county-effects. The results are in line
with what we expect when interpreting wages and
employment possibilities as push and pull effects.
The parameter on the number of stayers is almost
unity. Although neither labour market variable shows
significant effect in the sending region, they both
have a positive coefficient in the receiving region, at-
tracting the inflow of migrants. Proximity has a simi-
larly expected effect. Although the difference in mar-
ginal effects is more or less constant for the included
indicators (2 and up), there is a great jump from the
first neighbour to the second – just as raw data sug-
gests.
The second column presents almost the same specifi-
cation, the difference being that instead of county-
specific effects, I use route-specific (“bilateral”) ones
and proximity measures are of course absent.8 The
results are fairly similar to what we obtained previ-
ously, with the exception that the parameter on wages
in the sending region has a significant and negative
coefficient, as expected.
Note that time effects were not included either in this,
or in the previous specification. The reason for that is
the variation in the right-hand side variables comes
partly from the time dimension and the time effects
absorb that to a great extent. The third column, la-
belled 2TE shows the second set of estimates using
time effects as well. This results in a drop of signifi-
cance of wage in the sending region, an increase in
the effect of receiving region wages, and a decrease
in its employment rate. Because my preference is to
capture the effect of labour market variables and be-
cause the results do not seem to change substantially,
I prefer to drop time effects.
As already mentioned, Köllo˝ (2004) and Nagy (2004)
show that regional differences on the NUTS 1 level
change if we filter out composition effects. To check
how such a treatment affects estimation results, I re-
estimated model 2 using the adjusted wage and em-
ployment rate variables (see the previous section for
a description of the process). Results under heading
2C show a diminished effect, with a slightly changed
pattern of significance. Employment rates in both
sending and receiving regions are significant, while
wages in the receiving region ceased to be so.
Just as the theoretical discussion suggests, I wanted
to include variables to capture the effect of amenities
present in both the sending and the receiving loca-
tion, such as the (per capita) number of doctors,
crimes, suicides, visitor-nights. Unfortunately neither
of these variables proved to have a significant effect
on the flows, which is again a result of their relative
stability over time. Also because of this, we can hope
that the included fixed effects capture their effects
well enough – indeed, a Hausman test against either
the OLS or the random-effects alternative favour
fixed effects. Results are not shown for this specifica-
tion.
Even if the effect of amenities is stable over time,
there is an important factor influencing mobility,
namely cost of living. This, as already mentioned,
manifests itself to a great extent in housing costs.
Housing however plays a double role in the migration
decision. High property prices increase the cost of
rental, but given that most Hungarian households are
owner-occupiers, this is not a significant factor. Prop-
erty is more relevant when looked upon as an asset
the household. Hegedu˝s (2004) shows that it is to a
great extent the risk associated with selling the old
and purchasing the new property, thereby a potential
loss of a great part of their most important asset is
what discourages people from moving house. If nev-
ertheless the decision on moving is made, income
from selling house is one of the most important assets
the household can draw upon to finance the move to
either jumpstart a new life in a more promising, or in
a less expensive location. Housing markets have an-
other important effect on migration. As in many
countries, migration in and outflow is highly correlat-
ed in Hungary. Both Kertesi (2000) and Hegedu˝s
(2004) note this feature and attribute it to vacancy
chain-effects. Because of the limited availability of
housing, it is to a great extent moving households
that free up space for those looking for available
property.
To control for these effects, the specification shown
in Table 1 under heading 3 includes per square meter
housing prices as well as flats constructed for both
sending and receiving counties. Because property
prices are available only from 1997 on, column 3a
shows results from specification 2 constrained to this
period. Two of new variables have significant effects,
property prices in the sending and construction in the
8 Because a Hausman test rules out simple OLS and random-effect
GLS estimation, it is only the different fixed effect estimators I
consider. In case of the fixed effect estimators however, one might
raise the objection that if we believe that the equilibrating effect of
migration works through the labour market, we should not use
those, since the regressors’ strict exogeneity might be violated
through simultaneous determination of migration, wages and em-
ployment chances. Although this is a theoretically sound critique, I
believe it can safely be ignored in the current case where the level
of migration is extremely low. Since only a tiny fraction of a popu-
lation leaves through a given route (or at all, for that matter), its
impact on the local labour market is probably negligible.
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receiving region. The latter has a positive parameter,
which is in line with the vacancy-chain effect and
scarcity of flats. The positive effect of property prices
in the sending region also point towards the expected
direction.
While adding the new variables allow identifying
property-market effects, they also render formerly
significant labour-market effects insignificant. This is
partly a result of their initially low variation and
slightly different behaviour in the period starting in
1997 (see column 3a), but also that of the correlation
between wages and property prices. It is interesting
to note that it is the second specification where em-
ployment rate in the sending region has a significant
effect, comparable in absolute size to that of employ-
ment in the receiving region, when significant.
3.2 Sensitivity of the results and discus-
sion
There are a number of ways the stability of the esti-
mates can be checked. One obvious but unfortunately
infeasible one is to include additional regressors to
measure unobserved effects. As there are not many
spatial units, such attempts failed.
Unfortunately the relative scarcity of the data appears
in other ways, too. When using panel data, one might
want to check whether the poolability restriction im-
plicit in panel estimation holds true. Although even
setting the breakpoint in the middle of the time period
left what appears to be an insufficient number of ob-
servations (significance of most parameters drop
considerably), there is a clear pattern emerging. Until
around 1998, it is only employment in the receiving
region that has an effect on migration. Wages seem to
gain importance only after that – a factor that can be
connected to the start of economic growth. Poolabili-
ty is thus strictly speaking seems to be violated but
not to an extent that would affect qualitative conclu-
sions.
Poolability might be a question not only in time, but
also in terms of other attributes, such as space or eco-
nomic performance. Because Budapest and Pest
county are very special in many ways (exceptional
economic performance and the only unit of observa-
tion where suburban mobility might be relevant), I
repeated the estimation leaving out flows from or to
any or both of these counties, or flows between them.
In all of these experiments the (qualitative) results
were unchanged. Another sensible division is to con-
sider sending counties to the west and to the east to
the river Danube. Because the east is traditionally
more agricultural oriented and is in a generally worse
economic condition, one might think that motives
work in a different way here and there. The results
are surprisingly similar to that what we experienced
when cutting the sample half in time. It is only em-
ployment in the receiving region that seems to matter
in the west, but almost all of the factors play an im-
portant part in the east.
One might also argue that wages have different
meaning if agents have full access to credit markets
and when they do not – indeed, such a finding is a
cornerstone in the Andrienko and Guriev (2003)
study. To check the possibility of such an effect, I
separated the counties in terms of their per capita
GDP into two groups. Moving the divisor line to sep-
arate the best 13 from the others to the best 7 from the
others, one can observe a shift from the effect of em-
ployment possibilities (especially in the receiving re-
gion) to the effect of wages in both places.
Yet another doubt might be raised due to the arbitrari-
ness of the labour market variables. Why do we think
that it is wages and employment rate that represent
the chances of a potential employee most faithfully?
Why not use for example local GDP, or income tax
per taxpayer instead of wages, or unemployment rate
instead of employment rate? Checking for their valid-
ity, I used all of them, replacing the original vari-
ables. The qualitative results again did not change
much, although some variables were “stronger” then
others. This is especially true for unemployment,
which seemed to dominate wages, rendering them in-
significant. This can be attributed to the more direct
connection between the pressure of unemployment
on wages (the wage curve) than that coming from the
number of inactive people, which is an important
contributor to the employment rate.
All of the above results suggest that although the
pooled model gives a sensible description of the
overall migration, it would be useful to differentiate
impacts on the basis of time-periods and wealth of
the regions. Such an attempt however failed for two
possible reasons. One of these is that if we differenti-
ate in both respects, too great degrees of freedom are
used and impacts are not significant any more. The
second possibility is that also the stochastic structure
of the respective groups is different and not differen-
tiating this have adverse effects on the estimates.
Although we have seen a number of sensible and sig-
nificant effects in the above results, one might ask
whether the estimated parameters imply a sizeable,
not only statistically significant effect on migration.
Looking at the problem from a labour market per-
spective, one has to consider that the intensity of mi-
gration itself is rather low in Hungary and that its ex-
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tent declines rapidly with distance. If the destination
is not in an adjacent county, there is a more than 1
percent penalty on migration. Because of this, its
equilibrating effect can be high only if we observe
great changes as a response to incentives.
The estimates suggest that differences between aver-
age earnings have to increase by 3 percent to raise
migration flow by 1 percent in a given direction.
Looking at the evolution of wages, such change is en-
tirely plausible. Average wages in Budapest were by
around 48 percent higher in 1992 than in Nógrád, one
of the poorest counties. This difference grew to 80
percent in a decade. Although the original difference
was great enough, it also widened over time. This
comparison is biased however, because Budapest,
Pest county, and some other counties in the Western-
Transdanubia experienced the greatest economic
growth, so their advantage in wages is overwhelm-
ing. However, there are differences even among the
less well to do counties: Hajdú, for example, one of
the most eastern counties, has a steady 3–4 percent
advantage in average wages over Békés, its southern
neighbour – enough to generate some difference.
Another perspective is provided by results from other
studies relating to CEE countries. Although differ-
ences in regional units and other methodological dif-
ferences render a comparison imperfect, we can use
results from Fidrmuc (2002) and Andrienko and
Guriev (2003) for a tentative attempt. These show
that the measured impact of economic incentives is
not too small: parameters measured there rarely ex-
ceed unity, and are mostly close to what is obtained
here. One has to keep in mind however, that they in-
clude many more regressors, whose effect is never-
theless not always significant.
Then why is so migration low? Clearly, there are nu-
merous factors that are not included in the analysis
and these have positive as well as negative impact on
migration. Secondly, although differences in employ-
ment possibilities have higher impact than wages,
their geographic variability is also smaller. Thirdly,
here we measured the extent to which labour market
factors increase or decrease migration relative to an
“autonomous” base level. Because this level is rather
small, it remains small unless we multiply it by an
enormous number – an impact not observed in real
data.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we looked at county to county migration
in Hungary. Although regional differences in labour
market indicators seem to increase rather than dimin-
ish over time, migration rate is small and stable. Pre-
vious studies of Hungarian migration either focus on
earlier periods, such as the first half of the 1990s, or
use data in which imperfect measurement does not al-
low the clear interpretation of results. In the current
paper I used aggregate data to estimate the effect of
economic incentives on migration flows. Using coun-
ties as the unit of analysis has various drawbacks, but
also makes it possible to exclude the effect of reloca-
tion to suburban green-belts, a dominant feature of
Hungarian mobility that would generate perverse
labour maket effects, with “good” regions appearing
to deter, “bad” ones appearing to encourage in-migra-
tion.
To measure the extent of labour market incentives, I
estimated a gravity model in log-linear form, relating
place to place migration flows to several “push” and
“pull” effects, wages and employment/unemploy-
ment being the most important. Although low varia-
tion in the regressors prevented the inclusion of sev-
eral potentially important factors, there are several
robust results emerging. According to these both
wage differentials and differences in employment
rates encourage migration between counties. Al-
though there is no sign of evidence running against
this in the earlier 1990s, the relationship seems to sta-
bilise chiefly from 1998 on.
The property market is also found to have an impor-
tant effect on migration. People move away from
counties where property prices are high, possibly be-
cause of higher living expenses or because by mov-
ing to a cheaper neighbourhood, they can obtain a
stream of income from the profit realised in swapping
flats. Construction of property was found to have a
positive effect on inflow of migrants, which is in line
with previous evidence on vacancy-chain effects.
Even though labour market incentives were found to
have a significant effect on migration, the estimated
model has a fairly weak explanatory power. There are
so many factors affecting (or not affecting) migration
in Hungary, that such incentives alone are very un-
likely generate a stream of migrants that would possi-
bly able to reduce regional inequalities.
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Appendix
Descriptive statistics of the variables included
in the analysis
Variable (in log) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Migration 4940 4.60 1.22 0 10.088
Stayers 4940 12.98 .492 12.01 14.52
Average wage 3800 9.94 .154 9.69 10.52
Employment rate 3800 –.605 .103 –.899 –.417
Flat price 
(per square meter) 2280 2.97 .347 2.202 3.791
Flats constructed 4940 6.93 .689 5.193 8.85
